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COPY NO. 29

I.A.B. 5th Meeting

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132
New War Department Building
on Monday, 10 June 1946, at 2:30 P.M.

Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, in the Chair

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State for Research and
Intelligence
Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
of Intelligence, WDGS (Designate)
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear
Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M. Ladd (representing Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation)

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Group
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, G-2
Captain R.K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
Captain J.J. Rochefort, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E.P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. Colonel P.K. Newcomer, G-2
Colonel L.J. Fortier, Central Intelligence Group
Captain W.B. Goggins, USN, Central Intelligence Group
Mr. L.L. Montague, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel H.F. Cunningham, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel C.P. Nicholas, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel W.A. Perry, Central Intelligence Group
Colonel T.J. Sands, Central Intelligence Group

SECRETARIAT

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority
Mr. J.K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary

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1. PROVISION OF MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROADCASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS

(C.I.G. 1/1; C.I.G. 1/2, and C.I.G. 1/3)

ADMIRAL SOUERS recalled that the proposals raised in C.I.G. 1/1 and 1/2 had been considered provisionally in the previous meeting. In view of General Vandenberg's suggestion that the operation of FBIS be assumed by State, that department had been asked to make a study of its capabilities. The State Department replied (in C.I.G. 1/3) that while they were keenly interested in having the monitoring service continue it would be impossible for the Department to assume administrative responsibility for FBIS during the next fiscal year. ADMIRAL SOUERS felt that these developments justified the Members in approving C.I.G. 1/1, which in substance called for War Department operation of FBIS under directives from the Director of Central Intelligence as to collecting and distributing missions.

DR. LANGER underscored the reasons leading to State's conclusions. These were chiefly technical and budgetary. For example, State estimated that the administrative costs of FBIS would mean a 50 per cent increase in the entire amount budgeted for State's intelligence service--at a time when even the presently budgeted amounts had not been finally approved by Congress. There were also questions of the establishment of new stations in military zones, the transfer of some facilities now under British auspices, the procurement of new equipment, and the like--all of which he felt could be more effectively handled by the War Department at present.

GENERAL VANDENBERG observed that an eventual alternative to State or War Department administration would be direct control by Central Intelligence, if C.I.G. were to obtain an operating appropriation of its own. But such considerations could not apply in the solution of the immediate problem.

In the course of the general discussion which followed it was brought out by ADMIRAL SOUERS that the Central Intelligence Group at present could not accept a transfer of funds from War for direct administration of FBIS, since C.I.G. was not an authorized disbursing agency. It was therefore the consensus of the Members that the best immediate solution was operation by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department.

After concluding discussion,

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 1/1 subject to textual clarification to insure that the recommendation to the National Intelligence Authority provided for operation of the monitoring function by the Director of Central Intelligence with the administrative assistance of the War Department. (Report to N.I.A. to be circulated as N.I.A. 5).

2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY

ADMIRAL SOUERS invited discussion and criticism of the trial issue of the C.I.G. Weekly Summary circulated on 7 June. The discussion which followed centered on two issues developed by DR. LANGER: first, whether interpretive articles such as the Weekly contained could be prepared more effectively in C.I.G.,

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as in the trial issue, or by specialists in the contributing departments; and second, the suggestion that the Weekly concentrate on items where the C.I.G. has something new or novel to add to the normal intelligence produced by the departments.

As to the first point, DR. LANGER emphasized that he was wholly in favor of the undertaking represented by the Weekly Summary. However, it was essential to make the Weekly the best publication of which "this city" is capable. The job of interpretation needed to be done by people who have "responsibility and weight". For instance, he thought it inevitable that the best political comment would be obtained from the political sections of the State Department, where there was responsibility for policy as well as analysis, and that C.I.G. could hardly build up comparably well-informed groups of specialists within its own staff. On this assumption, he concluded that perhaps the preparation of articles for the Weekly should be transferred to the departmental experts. In this case, DR. LANGER thought, the C.I.G. editors would be left with the true function of correlating political intelligence judgments from State with related military judgments from the armed services. On his second point, he believed it might be a mistake for the Weekly to offer interpretations of matters already well covered in other publications, or where the Weekly did not have "something to add".

In acknowledging these issues, MR. MONTAGUE observed that the Weekly was not, of course, to be a summary of all the incidents of a week but an attempt to put into perspective some of the most important incidents and trends. Most of the events with which the Weekly dealt had already been reported briefly--and without opportunity for elucidation--in the C.I.G. daily summaries precoding. The Weekly was to provide background and "depth". The fact that the trial issue was heavily "political" in substance reflected the undermanned state of the reports staff; he was awaiting the arrival of several specialists from the contributing departments.

As to sources of material for the Weekly, MR. MONTAGUE thought it was clear that these would always be primarily the departmental cables and telegrams, plus departmental summaries such as the G-2 Weekly Summary and the State Department situation reports. The reports staff did not receive "raw" or unvaluated data. A much greater degree of contact with the departmental specialists was imperative, he agreed, and when the full staff had been assembled such contact should and would be continuous.

ADMIRAL SOUERS commented that C.I.G. had been fully aware of departmental responsibilities for the analysis of intelligence--the State Department's responsibility for foreign political intelligence, and so on. There was no attempt to compete with specialized summaries produced in State, War, and Navy. On the other hand, as he saw it, the problem was to produce a "reader's digest" which would collect and condense the most significant judgments from all these sources. He had been reluctant to begin the Weekly without an adequately manned staff and had given some thought to asking Members of I.A.B. to designate departmental experts who could meet with the reports staff on a regular basis, to insure policy screening at least--though not necessarily to write the articles themselves.

GENERAL VANDENBERG proposed that the Weekly continue publication under the common observation of the Members of I.A.B., and that he be advised whenever it was found that departmental views had been distorted or otherwise improperly represented.

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Specifically, he asked Dr. Langer to arrange a means whereby political intelligence texts could be promptly checked when necessary with a State Department specialist. He transmitted further specific comments and suggestions from G-2 regarding the trial issue to Mr. Montague.

The Members of I.A.B. were in agreement with General Vandenberg's proposal.

COMMODORE REND commented that it was essential to commence regular publication of the Weekly, despite shortcoming that might be inevitable in early issues; and GENERAL McDONALD and MR. LADD thought that, in view of all the circumstances, the reports staff should be congratulated on a good beginning.

3. PROVISIONS FOR COORDINATING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN PUBLICATIONS
(C.I.G. 9)

ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that replies had not yet been received from all Members regarding C.I.G. 9, which had been circulated for informal consideration. After brief discussion, during which it was agreed to reduce the classification of the paper to "Restricted",

THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-

Approved C.I.G. 9. (Enclosures to be submitted to N.I.A. as N.I.A. 4.)

4. REMARKS BY ADMIRAL SOUERS

ADMIRAL SOUERS said he wanted to take occasion, on being relieved as Director of Central Intelligence, to express to all Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board his appreciation for the unstinted cooperation he had received from each one. He took great satisfaction in turning over his duties to General Vandenberg.

GENERAL VANDENBERG, in an acknowledgment in behalf of all those present, expressed the hope that the work of Central Intelligence should be maintained at the standard set by Admiral Souers.

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